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IN THE SUPREME COURrii
OF THE STATE OF lJri"All

KEITH NORTH, By and through his
Guardian Ad Litem, C. E. NORTH.
Plaintiff and Appellamt.

Case No.
7457

YS.

C. H. CARTWRIGHT,
Defendant and Respondent.

Brief of Appellant
NATURE OF CASE
This suit was brought by the appellant, Keith North,
by and through his guardian ad litem, C. E. North,
against the respondent, C. H. Cartwright, to recover
damages for personal injuries sustained by the appellant
as a result of the respondent's driving an automobile
against the appellant and the motor scooter he was operating, the collision occurring on First South Street below
the intersection of Regent Street. At the close of the
trial the court directed a verdict of no cause of action,
and this appeal was taken.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the outset we desire to call the court's attention
to the fact that this case does not involve an intersection
accident, although it was so regarded by the trial court.
The undisputed evidence discloses that the collision oecurred at a point on First South Street 21 feet west of
the west curb line of Regent Street. (R. 108).
Appellant, a boy 17, was operating a small motor
scooter (Exhibit A) in a westerly direction on First
South Street (R. 48) at a speed of about 10 miles per
hour (R. 46). Seated behind him on the scooter was
Robert Cox, 14, ( R. 33-34). As they passed through the
intersection of Regent Street and First South Robert
Cox saw the respondent approaching from the left and
noted that the respondent was not looking in the scooter's
direction. Cox jumped off the scooter shouting, ''Look
out, Keith!'' The impact followed imediately after the
Cox boy jumped (R. 35). Prior to the impact, the appellant got a fleeting glimpse of the respondent's automobile
through his rear view mirror (R. 59.) The act of the Cox
boy in jumping off affected the motor scooter. The Cox
boy knew that it "pushed a little" when he jumped (R.
40). The motor scooter was going straight forward in a
westerly direction when the Cox boy jumped off, (R. 45)
and the scooter was close to and on the north side of the
center lines (R. 92). The appellant explained his presence on the south side of the white lines at the point of
impact in the following manner:
'' Q.

How did you get over on the south side of the
white lines~
2
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''A.

\Yell, I don't actually know, but I think this
could haYe happened: ·when Bob jumped
off, which he did, because I remember he
jumped off, and it's a small motor; it
doesn't weig-h yery much ,and it can be
pushed real-a slig-ht shove can send it
anywheres and at that time it was just that
quick." (R. 93)

The position of the Cox boy behind appellant on the
scooter did not interfere at all with the operation of the
scooter (R. 34, 49, 50).
The respondent told Officer Price that he stopped
for the stop sign on Regent Street and First South, that
traffic was heavy and he did not notice the boy on the
motor scooter until the time of impact.. He did not know
where the appellant came from or how he managed to
get in front of him (R. 137). The respondent asserted
that he looked twice to the west and once to the east as
he started up from the stop sign making his left turn, but
he did not see anything of the motor scooter at that time.
He heard the impact and his car automatically disengaged and stopped instantly. He saw the Cox boy jump off
shouting and that was the first time he was aware of the
situation (R. 154, 155). At the time he started up from
the stop sign his eyes were pretty much focused on a Salt
Lake City Lines bus going west on First South, and he
considered that it was safe for him to turn as far as the
bus was concerned. He did not see any other vehicles at
all on the highway east of the intersection (R. 160). The
first inkling- he got that a boy was operating a scooter in
the vicinity was after he heard the impact. He sort of
3
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saw the boy jump back out of the. right hand side of his
eye. Hardly a second passed from the time the boy
jumped back and the time he heard the impact. He was
not quite headed west when the impact occurred and the
front of the car was about four feet from the center line
at the time of impact (R. 163). Despite the skid marks
shown on Exhibit ''A'' the respondent said he did not
apply his brakes, but that the car just stopped on its
own accord when it hit the boy. (R. 165) After the collision he backed his car up about four feet, (R. 155) dragging the appellant, whose leg was caught (R. 57, 81).
The right front bumper of respondent's car contacted the motor scooter (R. 41) on the left rear side
(R. 35, 56). There were gouge marks indicating where
the scooter had been dragged by the backing operation,
which marks were located 21 feet west of the west side
of Regent Street and approximately 8 feet south of the
double line (R. 108). There were also skid marks made
by the Chrysler near that point extending for four feet
(R. 133, Exhibit "A"). Newly painted white lines, four
in number, ran down the center of First South and
First South is 90 feet from curb to curb. (R. 104-105)
There were marks of paint on the right front bumper of
the Chrysler (R. 116). At the time Exhibit "A" was
taken the car had been moved from the point of impact, except for the four-foot backing operation when the
appellant was dragged (R. 168). The extent and nature
of appellant's injuries are not material here.
It was stipulated at the trial that the following
ordinance of Salt Lake City was in full force and effect,
4
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I
Section 6128 ( c)3, Re-dsed Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, 1944:
''The driver of a Yehicle shall likewise stop in
obedience to a stop sign as required herein at an
intersection where n stop sign is erected at one or
more entrances thereto although not a part of a
through highway and shall proceed cautiously,
yielding to vehicles not so obliged to stop which
are within the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, but may
then proceed.''
To summarize the facts, it is clear that appellant
was traYeling close to and on the north side of the center
lines at a speed of about 10 miles per hour in a straight
westerly course. He had crossed through the intersection
when the respondent, operating his vehicle without observing appellant, cut the corner making a left turn.
The turning automobile came into fleeting view of appellant's rear view mirror the instant before the impact
which occurred 21 feet west of the west curb line of the
intersection. The respondent admits that he at no time
saw appellant until after the impact.
STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH
APPELLANT RELIES.

Point I. The respondent's negligence was clear and
undisputed.
Point II. The appellant was not contributorily negligent
as a matter of law.
5
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ARGUMENT

Point I. The respondent's negligence was clear a;nd
undisputed.
The .failure of the respondent to observe the appellant on his motor scooter prior to the impact was negligence. The failure of the respondent to yield the right-ofway to the appellant was negligence. The conduct of the
respondent in cutting the corner and hitting the appellant
at a point 21 feet west of the west curb line of Regent
Street was negligence-respondent should have been on
the north side of the center line prior to that point in
the reasonable operation of his car. It is likewise clear
that the negligent acts and omissions of the respondent
were the proximate cause of the collision.

Point II. The appellant was not
as a matter of law.

con~ributorily

negligent

We do not think that the evidence discloses that appellant was contributorily negligent at all, much less contributorily negligent as a matter of law. If, as he approached the intersection of First South and Regent
Street at a speed of approximately 10 miles per hour,
he had looked to the left and had observed that the respondent was stopped at the stop sign, the appellant would
have been reasonably justified in assuming that the
respondint would not enter the intersection, having
stopped, until it became safe for him to do so. If, as
the appellant entered the intersection from the east, he
had looked and observed that the respondent was pro6
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ceeding into the intersection on a turn to the west, the
appellant would still be reasonably justified in assuming
that the respondent would continue to yield the right-ofway, particularly in view of the evidence that the respondent was proceeding slowly. After appellant had
completely negotiated the intersection, it would be unreasonable to require him to continue to be apprehensive
of traffic approaching from his left rear, particularly in
view of the fact that he was proceeding very close to the
center line, and after having passed the intersection
it was not reasonably foreseeable that traffic would endanger him from the left rear. Certainly by the time appellant arrived at the point of the impact which was 21
feet west of the -west curbline of the intersection, he would
have been reasonably justified in divorcing his attention
from any traffic that could have proceeded out of Regent
Street, including the automobile driven by the respondent.
The traffic was heavy and ordinary prudence would require that the appellant give considerable attention to the
road ahead and to his right. It does not, therefore, appear
under what conceivable interpretation of the evidence
the trial court was justified in holding as a matter of law
that the appellant was contributorily negligent in permitting himself to be struck from the left rear by the respondent under the circumstances of this case. The case
at bar is much stronger from the appellant's standpoint
than that of Hess v. Robinson, 109 Utah 60, 163 P. 2d 510.
In that case the appellant was driving at 15 miles per
hour southward on Grant A venue, which was a through
highway. The respondents were driving an ambulance
eastward on 31st Street at a speed variously described
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as from 25 to 50 miles per hour, as it approached the intersection with Grant Avenue. The point of collision was
three feet west of the center point of the intersection. We
quote the following from the decision commencing on
page 64 of the Utah Reports :
'' ... The trial court instructed the jury that
the plaintiff was negligent in not so looking. But
does it follow as beyond dispute that had plaintiff looked and seen the ambulance approaching,
reasonable and prudent conduct would have dictated that he stop until the ambulance had crossed
the intersection~ Are the facts revealed by the
evidence so clear and certain that the court could
say that for plaintiff to drive into the intersection
without stopping was not the act of an ordinarily
prudent and careful man~ Since such question
must be answered from the circumstances existing
at the time, we are immediately confronted with
the question as to the speed of the ambulance. If
the ambulance was coming at 50 miles per hour,
as one witness testified, it might suggest to a
reasonable man that the ambulance probably would
not stop, or at least raise a reasonable apprehension of danger. If on the other hand, as defendants testified, the ambulance was coming only 25
miles per hour, (the course being upgrade) an
ordinarily prudent man may conclude that the
driver had his car under control and would stop
as required by law at the stop sign. As to what
the circumstances were at the time plaintiff entered the intersection and as to whether entering
under such circumstances was an act from which
a person of ordinary prudence and caution would
have foreseen that some injury would likely result,
are matters upon which minds may differ. As
such they are properly for the jury. Proximate
cause and contributory negligence are ordinarily
8
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I
I

questions of fart for the jury to determine under
all the circumstances. Great N. R. Co. v. Thompson, 9 Cir., 199 F. 395, 118 C.C.A. 79, 47 L.R.A.,
~.S. 506; Hales Y. Michigan Cent. R. Co. 6 Cir., 200
F. 533, 118 C.C.A. G:37. Questions of negligence do
not become questions of law for the court except
where the facts are such that all reasonable men
draw the same conclusions ... "
In the case just cited the collision occurred near the
center of the intersection and the ambulance was approaching the intersection at a speed of from 25 to 50
miles per hour and yet the court held that it was a jury
question as to whether or not the plaintiff, had he looked,
could have assumed that the ambulance would have
honored the stop sign. In the case at bar the collision occurred 21 feet west of the westernmost line of the intersection, and the respondent had stopped at the stop sign
and was proceeding slowly into the intersection on a left
turn. The conclusion is irresistible that the trial court
did violence to the principles established by the Hess
case supra. This case is distinguishable on its facts from
the more recent case of Hickok v. Skinner, 190 P. 2d 514
(Utah 1948). In that case the evidence showed that th~
defendant's vehicle was approaching the intersection at a
distance of 400 or 500 feet at a rate of 45 miles per hour
when first observed by the plaintiff, who had stopped 20
feet back from the intersection. The appellant didn't pay
any further attention to the respondent's fast approaching vehicle during any of that time that he traversed a
distance of 65 feet and for a period of approximately six
or seven seconds. The accident occurred within the intersection. The court held that the appellant was guilty of
9
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contributory negligence as a matter of law in not looking again to evaluate the speed of the respondent's
car and reappraise the relative position of the two cars.
In the case at bar this speed was not involved and areappraisal of the relative position of the vehicle prior to
the impact would not have required the appellant, in the
exercise of ordinary prudence, to assume that the respondent would not continue to honor his superjor right
within and beyond the intersection. The respondent, having stopped, proceeded slowly (though blindly) on his left
turn, and was apparently yielding the right-of-way to
the appellant or at least to traffic proceeding in the appellant's direction.
The case of Hess v. Robinson, supra, was referred to
1n the opinion of this court in the case of Conklitn v.
Walsh, (Utah 1948) 193 P. 2d 437, in which later case the
court, referring to the Hess case, made the following
statement on page 439:
"The driver of the car travelling the through
street, even though he should have seen the ambulance, which according to the evidence, was
traveling between 25 and 50 miles per hour, could
not know it would not stop for the stop sign until
the vehicles were so close together that he would
have no chance to avoid the collision."
In the Conklin v. Walsh case, the operator of the
truck approaching the intersection from the west on
South Temple had observed the approach of the plaintiff's car on the left but paid no further regard to it
during the time that he travelled a quarter of a block
(165 feet), and at the time he first saw the other vehicle,
10
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that vehicle was much nearer the intersection than was
his. Again the truck was travelling between 30 and 45
miles per hour and the collision occurred within the intersection. None of the circumstances upon which this court
predicated its decision in that case is presented by the
evidence in the case at bar.

CONCLUSION
The trial court, in directing the verdict against the
appellant, has ruled that as a matter of law there was no
reasonable view of the evidence which would have permitted the appellant to recover. Nevertheless, in the
review and discussion of the evidence in this brief we
have not just seized upon that portion of the evidence
most favorable to the position of the appellant, but we
have considered the evidence as a whole; and we respectfully conclude that, under any reasonable view of the
evidence that can be taken in this case, the appellant was
entitled to have the question of his contributory negligence determ~ned by the jury, and the trial court was altogether unjustified in holding as a matter of law that
the appellant was guilty of contributory negligence.

EDWARD W. CLYDE,
ALLAN E. MECHAM,
WOODROW D. WHITE,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant.
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